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Abstract 
While regional and international human rights institutions claim that the 
definition of a terrorist act under the Anti-terrorism Proclamation No. 
652/2009 is overly broad as a result of which citizens not involved in a 
genuinely terrorist act are prosecuted and jailed, the Ethiopian government 
defends the law pointing that it is borrowed from jurisdictions with 
advanced legal system and rule of law. This article is concerned with this 
debate and suggests how to deal with it. The article employs definitions 
under relevant regional and international counterterrorism legal instruments 
as standard to examine the scope of the domestic definition. With regard to 
some of its elements, the proclamation’s definition is broader than the 
standard definitions; in other aspects it is narrower. The regional and 
international instruments simply indicate what states should proscribe as a 
terrorist act without further prohibiting them from including other conduct 
with in domestic definitions. As such, being broader per se does not render 
the definition incompatible with regional and international definitions. On 
areas where the definition is narrower, its strict application would mean 
non-prosecution or, in the event of prosecution, acquittal of persons who 
would have been treated as terrorist under regional and international law. 
This has a direct bearing on Ethiopia’s counterterrorism obligation. 
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International and regional legal instruments urge states to prevent the 
commission of a terrorist act through, inter alia, criminalization. Although 
some are sceptical about the need and motive for promulgation of the 
Ethiopian anti-terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 (hereafter the 
Proclamation),1 from a legal point of view, by criminalizing a terrorist act, 
Ethiopia discharges its responsibility under international law.  
Article 3 of the Proclamation provides for a definition of a terrorist act. 
The definition establishes the threshold of a “terrorist act” from a legal 
perspective. This vital first step has been controversial ever since the law 
was presented in its draft form.2 While regional and international human 
rights institutions express concern on the broadness of definition of a 
terrorist act, officials of the Ethiopian government and some others defend it 
as being not broader than definitions in other jurisdictions.  
This article deals with scope of definition of a terrorist act under the 
proclamation in the following order. The first section briefly outlines the 
controversy surrounding the scope of the definition and how the purported 
lack of universally applicable definition of a terrorist act could be a major 
obstacle to undertake a meaningful assessment on the scope of definition of 
a terrorist act in a domestic legislation. Furthermore, it examines the 
plausibility of the government’s argument to justify the reach of the 
definition. Section 2 proposes two definitions of a terrorist act (one 
international and the other regional) that can be used as standard to evaluate 
the scope of the definition under the proclamation followed by analysis of 
their elements in Section 3. The fourth section discusses the definition of a 
terrorist act under the Proclamation. The discussion, not being intended to 
provide an in-depth analysis and interpretation of the definition3, is confined 
                                           
1 See: Ethiopian Political Parties Position on the Anti-Terrorism Law, parts 1-3. 




2 Human Rights watch (2009), An Analysis of Ethiopia’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Law 
Updated,  Retrieved from 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Ethiopia%20CT%20Law
%20Analysis%20June%202009_2.pdf >. 
3 For a brief analysis on how some parts of the definition could be applied broadly 
see: Hiruy Wube (2012), “Some Points on the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Law 
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to the extent needed to evaluate the scope of the definition. Section 5 is the 
actual appraisal of the definition. It examines the definition vis-à-vis the 
proposed standard definitions, and reveals a mixture of narrowness and 
broadness therein. The section further examines the effect, on its validity, of 
the definition’s deviation from the standards. The article winds up with a 
conclusion.  
1. Controversy on the scope of the definition and the 
problematic nature of judging it  
    1.1 The controversy 
Regional and international human rights institutions have expressed concern 
on the broadness of definition of a terrorist act. In its analysis of the 
proclamation, Human Rights Watch identifies what it considers as 
problematic areas of the legislation,4 of which one is its ‘extremely broad’ 
definition of a terrorist act.  In its Comment on Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation, Article 19 identifies over-broadness of the definitional 
provision as particularly worrying.5 David Shinn and Thomas Ofcansky 
label the definition as broad.6 Similarly, Hiruy points out some of the 
elements of the definition that would give it a wider reach.7  Many who do 
not agree with the conviction of journalists and opposition political party 
leaders under the proclamation attribute the conviction to the over-broadness 
of the definition.8 
                                                                                                       
from Human Rights Perspective”, Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol, 25 No.2, pp. 
43-46. 
4 Human Rights watch (2009), supra note 2, pp. 1, 4.   
5 Article 19 (2010), Comment on Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, 2009, of Ethiopia,  
pp. 3,4. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/ethiopia-comment-on-anti-
terrorism-proclamation-2009.pdf>. 
6 David H. Shinn, and Thomas P. Ofcansky (2013), Historical Dictionary of 
Ethiopia, (Lanham Maryland: Scarecrow press), p. 388. 
7 Hiruy Wube (2012), supra note 3, pp. 43-46. 
8 In 2012 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, denouncing 
conviction and sentencing of journalists and opposition figures, said she is 
seriously alarmed about the current climate of intimidation against human rights 
defenders and journalists in Ethiopia, resulting from the use of “overly broad” 
laws on terrorism and civil society registration. United Nations Human Rights 
(2012), Climate of intimidation against rights defenders and journalists in 
Ethiopia. Retrieved from:   
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In response to such criticism, government officials9 claim the language of 
the definition was simply pulled from antiterrorism legislation of democratic 
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, thereby 
asserting that it is not broader than the definitions in the anti-terrorism 
legislation of these countries. Others10 follow a similar approach and 
evaluate the scope of the definition under the anti-terrorism proclamation in 
                                                                                                       
  
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12365
&LangID=E >; Patrick Griffith (2013), “Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 
and the right to freedom of expression”, freedom now, August 30. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.freedom-now.org/news/ethiopias-anti-terrorism-proclamation-and-
the-right-to-freedom-of-expression/>; Human Rights Council Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention (2012), Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention at its Sixty Fifth Session, 14-23 Nov,  No. 62/2012 (The 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia), Retrieved from: <http://www.freedom-
now.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Eskinder-Nega-WGAD-Opinion.pdf>; 
Human Rights Watch (2011),  Ethiopia: Journalists Convicted Under Unfair Law, 
Deeply Flawed anti-terrorism Act should be revoked, retrieved from: 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/21/ethiopia-journalists-convicted-under-
unfair-law> ; Amnesty International (2012), Ethiopia: Conviction of government 
opponents a 'dark day' for freedom of expression, retrieved from: 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/ethiopia-conviction-government-opponents-
dark-day-freedom-expression-2012-06-27>. 
9 During a discussion of the law in its draft form it was indicated that the definition 
part is directly copied from the anti-terrorism law of the United Kingdom.Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 3rd House of Peoples Representatives  
(2008/2009), 4th year Adopted Proclamations, Public Discussions and 
Recommendations, Volume 7, p.116-117.The late Prime Minster Meles Zenawi 
indicated that the proclamation is copied word by word from the UK. Yemane 
Negash, “ኤርፖርት ላይ Eንደሚታነቁ የሚያምኑ ሰዎች ቢኖሩም IሕAዴግ ግን ስለመኖራቸውም 
Aያውቅም”, Reporter, Amharic version, December 10, 2014. Retrieved from:  
   <http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/index.php/politics/item/8182>. Also see: a 
program on Terrorism in Ethiopia hosted by Ethiopian Television and Radio 
Agency in 2013,  part two, Available at:  
   <http://www.mereja.com/video/watch.php?vid=ecb2493b5>; Griffith (2013), 
supra note 8. 
10 SasahulehYalew, A Comparative Review of Ethiopian and Western Anti-
Terrorism Legislations. Retrieved from:  
     <http://www.aigaforum.com/articles/Ethiopia-anti-terrorism.pdf>. A senior 
lawyer and a Federal High Court judge make this claim. Terrorism in Ethiopia, 
supra note 9. 
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light of definitions provided in the democratic jurisdictions to conclude that 
it is not broader, if not narrower.  
1.2 Plausibility of referencing to other jurisdictions  
Different standards are applied to examine the scope of definitions of a 
terrorist act in domestic anti-terrorism laws11 as a result of the commonly 
held view that international law does not provide a binding definition of 
terrorist act that states should comply with. Officials of the Ethiopian 
Government and others justify the reach of the definition in the proclamation 
claiming that it is copied from definitions in antiterrorism laws of other 
jurisdictions. How relevant and persuasive is this approach?  
To start with, a quick comparison between the definition in the 
proclamation and in the foreign laws from which the definition is said to 
have been copied shows that the claim is misleading. Griffith, comparing the 
definition in the proclamation with that of the definition in the UK anti-
terrorism law, notes “while Ethiopia’s Anti-Terror Proclamation borrows 
some key phrases, it is significantly more expansive – and vague – than the 
statutes it purports to mirror”.12 Griffith indicates “compared with UK’s 
equivalent piece of legislation, the Ethiopian Anti-Terror Proclamation 
simply lifts an introductory paragraph while omitting the following seven 
sections that define and limit the law’s scope”.13 Furthermore, while the 
motive requirement in the definition of the UK anti-terrorism legislation has 
been amended,14 it forms part of the definition under the Ethiopian Anti-
terrorism Proclamation.  
The Australian anti-terrorism law, one of the legislation said to have been 
used as a basis for the Ethiopian Anti-terrorism Proclamation, incorporates a 
sub-article which provides for an exception to “advocacy, protest, dissent or 
industrial action” not to be considered as terrorist acts if not intended to 
                                           
11 Reuven Young (2006), “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a 
Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic 
Legislation”, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 
29, issue 1; Keiran Hardy and George Williams (2011), ‘What is “terrorism”? 
Assessing Domestic Legal Definitions’ UCLA Journal of International Law & 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 16. 
12 Griffith (2013), supra note 8. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Counter-terrorism Act 2008 (UK), s 75(1); Roger Douglas (2010), Must terrorists 
act for a cause? The motivational requirement in definitions of terrorism in the 
United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin, 36:2, 295-312, p. 299 DOI: 10.1080/03050718.2010.481400 
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“cause serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or cause a person’s 
death; or endanger the life of a person, other than the person taking in the 
action; or create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a 
section of the public”.15 This political protest exception, which is 
commended as a safeguard for legitimate forms of political activities,16 is 
not part of the Ethiopian anti-terrorism proclamation. 
Be the factual accuracy of the claim as it may, there are several reasons 
that would make the aptness of defending the scope of the definition by 
invoking its sources doubtful. First, the relevance of this approach to 
Ethiopia where reference to legislation or cases decided in other jurisdictions 
is not a recognized way of resolving a legal issue17, is minimal, if any, other 
than for legal scholarship purposes.  
Second, the definitions embodied in the anti-terrorism legislation of 
jurisdictions that are invoked to have been used as basis for the definition in 
the proclamation have been condemned by international human rights 
bodies. For example, in 2005, the Human Rights Committee found that the 
definition of terrorism in the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 was overly 
broad.18 The Committee found that the similar language in the Australian 
Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2) 2005 violated international human rights norms 
and recommended its amendment.19 
Thus, the definition in the proclamation being a reproduction of the 
definitions in the cited jurisdictions does not save the definition from being 
criticised as a broad one. Rather, by the government’s own admission, the 
definition would be vulnerable to the same criticism as its sources have been 
subjected to, one of which is broadness. What is worse, the definition in the 
proclamation, as opposed to its claimed sources, is devoid of safeguards 
against misuse of the definition to suppress legitimate political activities.  
                                           
15 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 100.1 (Austl); Jude McCulloch (2002-2003), 
“Counterterrorism Human Security and Globalization from Welfare to warfare 
State?”Current issues in criminal justice, vol. 14, p. 285. 
16 Sec. Legislation Review Comm. (Austl.), Report of the Security Legislation 
Review Committee 57 (June 2006) in Hardy and Williams (2011), supra note 11,   
p. 135. 
17  Article 78 (3) of the FDRE Constitution provides: “Judges shall exercise their 
functions in full independence and shall be directed solely by the law.”  
18 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, Canada, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, 2 November 2005).   
19 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, Australia, 
CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5/CRP/1, 2 April 2009. 
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Third, the jurisdictions from which the definition is said to have been 
taken have strong democratic culture where the prosecution and the courts 
have the highest degree of independence and loyalty to rule of law. For 
example, in relation to the UK anti-terror legislation, Lord Carlile 
acknowledges that owing to the broadness of the definition of terrorism, 
non-terrorist conducts including protestors who support women’s rights and 
environmental causes could fall within the terrorism Act 2000 definition.20  
However, for him such a theoretical possibility is not a problem in a country 
with strong traditions of democratic accountability as, he believes, that 
“sensible use of the discretion to prosecute … would protect individuals 
from unjustified state interference”.21  
Likewise, the Australian High Court acknowledges that the complexity 
and nature of the definition of terrorism in the relevant section of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) makes it capable of catching range of non-
terrorist conducts. However, the court held, this quality was not 
incompatible with the exercise of federal judicial power.22A similar position 
is taken by Justice Rutherford of Canada. While he acknowledges the 
theoretical possibility that the Anti-Terrorism act 2001 of Canada could be 
applied to a non-terrorist conduct, he reasons that any conduct that was 
clearly non-terrorist would be excluded from the definition through judicial 
interpretation.23 This assumption is hardly possible in emerging democracies, 
like Ethiopia, where such level of reliance on the prosecution and the 
judiciary is hardly imaginable.24 
                                           
20 Lord Carlile (2007), Definition of Terrorism A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew 
Q.C.; Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Cm 7052, para. 34 in 
Hardy and Williams, supra note 11, p. 118. 
21 “Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Report on the Operation in 2005 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000, 2006, para 30”.;  Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Independent Reviewer 
of Terrorism Legislation, The Definition of Terrorism, 2007, Cm. 7052, para 34.;  
Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Report on the Operation in 2004 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000, para 27 (U.K.) in Hardy and Williams, supra note 11, p. 118. 
22 Thomas v Mowbray (2007), 233 CLR 307 (Austl.) in Hardy and Williams, supra 
note 11, p 133. 
23 R v Khawaja, [2006] O.J. No. 4245 (Can.) in Hardy and Williams, supra note 11, 
p. 124 
24 This was the point that Enginer Yilekal, president of the Blue Party, raised during 
the televised debate on the Ethiopian Anti-terrorism proclamation. Discounting 
the importance of adapting laws of democracies in and by itself he jokingly asked 
the government officials to bring the institutions of the democratic countries as 
well. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nr76bQEtnlA>. 
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1.3 The difficulty of judging the controversy 
Apparently, there is no easy way of judging the dispute pertaining to the 
broadness of the definition of a terrorist act.  That is because of the claimed 
lack of a definition of terrorism in general and in Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (hereafter the resolution) in particular. While the resolution 
is applauded for mobilizing states to take counterterrorism legislative 
measures (something which could not have been achieved through the treaty 
process),25 it has been subject to several criticisms.26 The one major criticism 
is that it fails to define the term ‘terrorist act’. Although the resolution 
mentions ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist act’ numerous times, it does not explicitly 
provide for their meaning.  
Roach describes this gap as a ‘critical lacunae’ in resolution 1373.27  
Samuel characterizes absence of universal definition of terrorism28 in 
general as the major gap in the rule of law framework of international 
counterterrorism.29 Thus, many have asserted that the Security Council has 
                                           
25 Nicholas Rostow (2001-2002), ‘Before and After: The Changed UN Response to 
Terrorism since September 11th’ Cornell International Law Journal, Vol 35, 475, 
481-84. 
26 Resolution 1373 is criticised for circumventing the requirement of consent of 
States as a conventional law making process by instructing them to adopt and 
implement anti-terrorism measures. Nigel D. White (2012), ‘The United Nations 
and Counter-Terrorism: Multilateral and Executive Law-Making’ in Ana Maria 
Salinas De Frias, Katja LH Samuel, and Nigel D White (eds.),  Counter terrorism 
International Law and Practice (Oxford University Press) 54, 72; Rostow (2001-
2002), supra  note 25, 482; Ben Saul (2005), ‘Definition of ‘‘Terrorism’’ in the 
UN Security Council: 1985–2004,’  Chinese Journal of International Law, 141, 
161, 165. 
27 Kent Roach (2008), ‘Defining Terrorism: the need for a restrained Definition’ in 
Laviolette N, Forcese C (eds.), the Human Rights of Anti-terrorism (Irwin Law, 
2008)  p. 99.  
28 Two courts, one national another international, have adopted a different view of 
the definition controversy. The UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon and an Italian 
court   recognize a customary law definition for the crime of terrorism. Ben Saul 
(2012), ‘Civilizing the Exception: Universally Defining Terrorism’ in Aniceto 
Masferrer (ed.), Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency: Security 
and Human Rights in Countering Terrorism (2012) 79, 80, 85.  
29 Katja LH Samuel (2012), ‘The Rule of Law Framework and its Lacunae: 
Normative, Interpretative, and/or Policy Created?’ in  Ana Maria Salinas De 
Frias, Katja LH Samuel, and Nigel D White (eds.), Counter terrorism 
International Law and Practice (Oxford University Press,) 14, 16-19.    
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left the definition of terrorism to individual governments.30 Similarly, others 
observe that the imposition of an obligation on a state to criminalize a 
‘terrorist’ act without providing a definition or guideline means authorizing 
a state to “define terrorism according to its own history, objectives and 
concerns”31 which permits a range of overbroad definitions. Guillaume 
upholds a similar view and argues that requiring states to take measures 
against terrorism, without defining it, enables states to make “unilateral 
interpretations geared towards their own interests.”32 
Both sides of the argument on the broadness of the definition of a 
terrorist act in the Proclamation involve judging its reach according to a 
standard. If there is no universally accepted definition of a terrorist act, so 
much so that ‘one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter’,33 and if 
justifying the scope of the definition by referencing to definitions in other 
jurisdictions is not acceptable, what is the right way to evaluate the scope of 
the definition of a terrorist act under the proclamation? The next section is 








                                           
30 Ben Saul (2006), Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford University 
Press ) 316-17, 320; Rostow, supra note 25, 484; Roach (2008), supra note 27, 
98-99; Young (2006), supra note 11, pp. 23, 44. 
31 Kent Roach, Michael Hor, Victor V. Ramraj and George Williams (2012), 
“Introduction” in  Kent Roach, Michael Hor, Victor V. Ramraj and George 
Williams (eds.),  Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge University 
Press , 2nd ed.) 1, 4. 
32 Gilbert Guillaume (2004), “Terrorism and International Law”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 53, pp. 537, 540. 
33 George P. Fletcher (2006), “The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism”, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, vol. 4, p. 906. Ved Nanda rightly attributes this 
cliché to the international community’s inability to provide a common definition. 
Ved Nanda (2001), ‘The Role of International Law in Combating Terrorism’ 
Michigan State University-Detroit College of Laws Journal of International Law, 
Vol. ,10, pp. 603, 604. 
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2. Search for a standard definition  
True, by not expressly defining a terrorist act, the resolution, enforcement of 
which is one of the justifications for the proclamation,34 makes its subject 
matter unclear. However, it was not meant to give states a blank cheque to 
fight terrorism according to their own definitions.35 By requiring or calling 
upon states to take the several measures against a terrorist act, it would be 
logical to assume that the Security Council would not be using the term 
‘terrorist act’ to mean everything or nothing.36 It must have been referring to 
something.37A close reading of the resolution, as argued below, suggests 
what that something is.  
Logical consistency requires that terrorist acts, the financing of which 
states are obliged to criminalize under paragraph 1 of resolution 1373, 
should not be different from (broader or narrower in scope than) terrorist 
                                           
34 Wondwossen D Kassa (2013), ‘Examining some of the Raisons deter for the 
Ethiopian anti-terrorism law’, Mizan law Review, Vol 7, No.1, pp. 49-66. 
35  Andrea Bianchi  (2006), ‘Security Council’s Anti-terror Resolutions and their 
Implementation by Member States’ Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
vol 4, 1044-73,1050. 
36 Indeed as argued by Professor Oscar Schachter even lack of a comprehensive 
definition “does not mean that international terrorism is not identifiable. It has a 
core meaning that all definitions recognize.” Oscar Schachter (1989), ‘The 
Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases’, Hous. J. Int’l L. Vol 11, 
309, 309. 
37 Other sources confirm this. The Counter Terrorism Committee indicates that its 
members have a fair idea of the meaning of terrorism under the resolution. CTC 
Chair (Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock), Presentation to Symposium: Combating 
International Terrorism: The Contribution of the United Nations, Vienna, 3–4 
June 2002 quoted in Saul (2005), supra note 26, 157.  Jeremy Greenstock, former 
British Ambassador to the United Nations and chair of the Committee, stated: 
"increasingly, questions are being raised about the problem of the definition of a 
terrorist. Let us be wise and focused about this: terrorism is terrorism. . . . What 
looks, smells and kills like terrorism is terrorism." John Collins, Terrorism, in 
Collateral Language: A User’s Guide to America’s New war 167-68 (John 
Collins & Ross Glover eds., 2002) quoted in Alex Schmidt (2004), ‘Terrorism-
the Definitional Problem’, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 
vol 36,  375. Though some states have expressed their concern about lack of 
explicit definition in the resolution, others believe that definition is unnecessary 
as it was defined in a previous General Assembly Resolution. Saul (2005), supra 
note 26, p. 159. Moreover, Resolution 1373 was passed on the assumption that 
the meaning of terrorism is known from previous counterterrorism legal 
instruments. Rostow (2001-2002), supra note 25, 487. 
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acts that the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism (hereafter Suppression of Financing Convention or the 
Convention)  refers to.38 Paragraph 3(d) of the resolution calls upon39 states 
to become parties to the Convention.40 The Security Council would not have 
made this call, had it used the phrase ‘terrorist acts’ (the financing of which 
it requires states to criminalize, under paragraph 1 of the resolution), 
differently from its meaning under the Suppression of Financing Convention 
that it refers to under its paragraph 3(d). If the meaning of terrorist acts, as 
used under paragraph 1 of the resolution, is different from its meaning under 
the Convention, states will not be able to comply with both paragraphs 1 and 
3(d) of the resolution simultaneously.41  Where a state, responding to the 
Security Council’s call under paragraph 3(d) of the resolution, ratifies the 
                                           
38 Szasz asserts that “the provisions of operative paragraph 1 of Resolution 1373, --- 
are clearly based on the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism.” Paul Szasz (2002), ‘The Security Council Starts 
Legislating’ American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, 901, 903. The 
Counter Terrorism Committee opined that “resolution 1373 should be interpreted 
in compliance with existing international agreements.” UN Information Service 
(2003), ‘Human Rights Committee Briefed on Work of Counter-terrorism 
Committee’ (press release HR/CT/630 27 March 2003)  
    <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/hrct630.doc.htm>.Wainwright, 
former expert adviser to the Counter Terrorism Committee, indicates that because 
resolution 1373 calls upon states to give effect to the relevant counter-terrorism 
international instruments “the CTC has seen fit to import into its interpretation of 
the resolution concepts included in those instruments, in particular, the fairly 
detailed description of terrorism included in the Financing Convention.” Jeremy 
Wainwright ‘Some aspects of compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 
1373’ (2005)  
   <http://www.opc.gov.au/calc/docs/Loophole_papers/Wainwright_Mar2005.pdf> 
at 15 June 2014. 
39 As noted by Szasz, it is for political reasons that the Council makes participation 
in the convention optional. Szasz (2002), supra note 38, 903.  
40 The obligations that the resolution imposes on the states under its paragraph 1 are 
so similar with those imposed under the Suppression of Financing Convention 
that Bantekas describes Paragraph 3(d) of the resolution which, he thinks, makes 
a needless call for states to ratify the Convention as ‘ironic’. Ilias Bantekas 
(2003),  “The International Law of Terrorist Financing” The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 315-333, P. 326 
41 However, it is self-evident that the Security Council would like the States both to 
implement paragraph 1 and to ratify the Convention in compliance with 
paragraph 3(d) of the resolution. Thus, the resolution has to be interpreted in such 
a manner that compliance with both paragraphs at the same time is possible. 
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Suppression of Financing Convention, the state undertakes to criminalize 
financing of terrorist acts as defined under the Convention.42 If the meaning 
of terrorist acts referred to under paragraph 1 of the resolution is different 
from that provided under the convention, then it will neither practically nor 
theoretically be possible for the state to comply with both paragraphs of the 
resolution concurrently. This anomalous consequence would not be the 
Security Council’s intention. The only way to circumvent this anomaly is to 
interpret ‘terrorist acts’ as used under paragraph 1 of the resolution and in 
the Suppression of Financing Convention to refer to the same conduct.  
It is reasonable to assume that the Security Council, in mentioning the 
phrase ‘terrorist acts’ in the different paragraphs of the resolution,43 refers to 
the same conduct. That is, for example, ‘terrorist acts’, the financing of 
which states are instructed to criminalize under paragraph 1 of the resolution 
would not be different from ‘terrorist acts’ the commission of which states 
are required, under paragraph 2(b) of the resolution, to prevent. 
Because the meaning of terrorist acts, as used in other paragraphs of the 
resolution, would not be different from the meaning given to terrorist acts 
under the resolution’s first paragraph (which, as argued above, refers to the 
meaning of a terrorist act under Article 2 (1) of the Suppression of Financing 
Convention), it stands to reason that this definition is applicable to terrorist 
acts that resolution 1373 refers to in all of its different paragraphs.44 
This argument is supported by the Council’s subsequent practice. 
Although states routinely claim terrorist attacks being made in their 
territories (based on their own definition of terrorism), the Security Council 
has never taken every allegation seriously.45 The Council has consistently 
                                           
42 Szasz, supra note 38, p.  903. 
43 The resolution has made about forty mentions of terrorism, terrorists or terrorist 
acts. 
44 It is not uncommon to infer the intention of the Security Council from what it has 
expressly stated. For example, Szasz argues that in resolution 1373 the Security 
Council implicitly approves previous General Assembly recommendations.  
Szasz, supra note 38, p. 903. Similarly, Saul notes that Resolution 1373 
implicitly authorized self defence against terrorism. Saul (2005), supra note 26, 
p.160. 
45 For the sporadic involvement of the Security Council in domestic terrorism 
Cases, which arguably do not fall under the Convention’s definition, see: 
Wondwossen Kassa (2013), supra note 34, pp. 60-63. 
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confined its involvement to attacks46 which are grave enough to be captured 
by the definition provided under the Suppression of Financing Convention. 
The definition of a terrorist act provided under Security Council 
resolution 1566 of 2004 is another evidence to demonstrate the Security 
Council’s understanding of the term. Under Paragraph 3 of the resolution, 
the Security Council, 
… Recalls that criminal acts, … committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons 
or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government 
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, 
which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the 
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under 
no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature, … ; 
As rightly noted by Hardy and Williams, this definition is “practically 
indistinguishable”47 from the definition under the Suppression of Financing 
Convention. This ‘striking’ similarity gives credence to the argument that 
the Council understands the term terrorist act, while passing resolution 1373, 
to refer to a terrorist act as defined under the Suppression of Financing 
Convention.48 The Security Council espouses the Convention’s definition in 
both resolutions, explicitly in resolution 1566 and tacitly in resolution 1373. 
While the definition provided under the Convention is one that is 
imposed from the Security Council through the resolution, there is another 
definition that Ethiopia has voluntarily accepted—the definition under the 
OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (hereafter 
                                           
46 The Council adopted resolutions denouncing bomb attacks (Bali and Kenya in 
2002, Bogota and Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005) and 
hostage takings (Moscow, 2002). 
47 Hardy and Williams (2011), supra note 11, pp. 77, 93. See Thomas Weigend 
(2006), “The Universal Terrorist: The International Community Grappling with a 
Definition”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 4, p. 920 
48 Curtis Ward, Legal Expert for the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC), invoked a legal instrument(The Ministerial Declaration 
annexed to Security Council resolution 1456 (2003)) which was passed after 
resolution 1373  to support his view that the Security Council intended, under 
resolution 1373, to require states to ensure that their counterterrorism activity is 
compatible with human rights. UN Information Service, (2003), supra note 38.   
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OAU Convention).49 Among others, the proclamation is meant to enforce 
agreements that have been entered into at the United Nations and African 
level.50  A recommendation that the Legal and Administration, and Defence 
and Security Affairs Standing Committees submitted to the House of 
Peoples’ Representatives indicate that the proclamation is drafted based on 
international and regional counterterrorism treaties that Ethiopia is a party 
to.51 Thus, the definition under this convention is pertinent to examine the 
scope of the definition under the Proclamation. 
3. What constitutes a ‘terrorist act’ under the standard 
Definitions? 
     3.1. Suppression of Financing Convention 
Paragraph 2(1) of the Suppression of Financing Convention defines a 
terrorist act as follows. 
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as 
defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or  
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such 
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act.  
Under paragraph 2(1)(a), a conduct would be regarded as a terrorist act if it 
falls within one of the nine treaties52 listed in the annex to the convention.53 
                                           
49 It was adopted in 1999. Ethiopia ratifies the convention in 2003.  Apart from 
calling, in its paragraph 3(d),  for states to become parties to the international 
treaties relating to countering terrorism Security Council resolution no 1373, in 
its Paragraph 3 (c), further calls upon states “to cooperate, particularly through 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress 
terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts.” The OAU 
Convention has to be seen in this context. 
50 Preamble, Anti-terrorism Proclamation no 652/2009; Wondwossen Kassa (2013), 
supra note 34. 
51 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, supra note 9, p. 133 
52 They are: 
1. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at 
The Hague on 16 December 1970. 
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Two exceptional instances (where an act that falls within one of these 
treaties may not be considered as terrorist act for a state party to the 
Suppression of Financing Convention) are provided under paragraph 2(2) of 
the Convention.  According to sub paragraph 2(2)(a), a state, at the time of 
becoming a party to the Suppression of Financing Terrorism, has the right to 
express its reservation that any treaty, which it is not party to, not be deemed 
to be included in the annex referred to under Paragraph 2(1)(a). If it does not 
express its reservation, the treaty to which it is not a party will be applicable 
to that state, by virtue of Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Convention, for the 
purpose of criminalizing financing of the act prohibited under the treaty.  
Similarly, by virtue of sub paragraph 2(2)(b) where a state which had been a 
party to any of the treaties referred under Article 2(1)(a) of the Convention 
ceases to be so, it can terminate the applicability of the Suppression of 
                                                                                                       
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971. 
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973. 
4. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. 
5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at 
Vienna on 3 March 1980. 
6. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done 
at Montreal on 24 February 1988. 
7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988. 
8. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 
1988. 
9. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 
1997. 
53 At the time when the Suppression of Financing Convention was adopted there 
were ten counterterrorism instruments: eight conventions and two protocols. The 
annex (Paragraph 2(1) (a)) to the convention refers to seven of the conventions 
and to both protocols. The only convention not included in the list is the 1963 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On board Aircraft 
(Aircraft Convention) which prohibits conduct that do or may affect in-flight 
safety. 
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Financing Convention to the act covered by the treaty which it ceases to be a 
party to by making a declaration to that effect.     
By making such declaration, a state not a party to one of the treaties listed 
in the Annex to the Financing Convention makes the treaty to be presumed 
not to be in the list for the purpose of Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Convention.  
It is noteworthy that the exclusion of a certain act from sub paragraph 
2(1)(a) provides eligibility to be included in the definition provided under 
sub paragraph ‘b’. Though not being included in the treaties listed under 
article 2(1)(a) is necessary, other elements need to be fulfilled for an act to 
be  regarded as a terrorist act under the definition that sub paragraph 2(1)(b) 
provides.  These elements are discussed below.  
Different authors analyse definitions of a terrorist act by taking different 
elements.54 Here two elements of the definition are considered. The first 
element is what Weigend calls the ‘base offence,’55 which refers to the 
ordinary crime that forms the basis of a terrorist act. The second is what 
Cassese refers to as ‘purpose of the act,’56  which denotes the mental 
element that distinguishes a terrorist act from ordinary crimes.  
Base offence 
The base offence is the underlying crime of a terrorist act which refers to an 
act “intended to cause death or serious bodily injury”.57 It has nothing to do 
with property offences or victimless offences.58 As noted by Fletcher, 
“terrorism is premised on the violent attack on life and security of human 
beings.”59 Thus, the first element relates to conduct that is in and by itself 
“already criminalized”60 under national criminal law. The act would have 
been an ordinary crime (as opposed to a terrorist crime) of intentional 
                                           
54 For example, Fletcher identifies eight variables of terrorism. Fletcher (2006), 
supra note 33, pp. 901-911; Cassese approaches the notion of terrorism in terms 
of its objective and subjective elements in Antonio Cassese (2006), Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 4, 935-958. 
55 Weigend (2006), supra note 47, p. 929. 
56 Cassese (2006), supra note 54, p. 938. 
57 There is no restriction on the means of committing the act (it can be a machine 
gun, knife …) in so far as it is intended and perhaps reasonably capable of 
resulting in death or bodily injury.  Anthony Aust (2001), "Counter-Terrorism—
A New Approach: The International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism" Max Planck Institute UNYB, Vol. 5: 11, p. 298.   
58 Fletcher (2006), supra note 33, pp. 894-911. 
59 Ibid, 894, 901. 
60 Cassese (2006), supra note 54, p. 938.  
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homicide or grave bodily injury or an attempt to commit these offences had 
it not been for the specific purpose accompanying the act.  
Young refers to this element of the definition as the ‘proscribed harm.’61 
While Wigenede describes it as the only objective element62 of definition of 
a terrorist act, another scholar describes this element as the actus reus of an 
international crime of terrorism.63 However, in addition to a doing of a 
certain act, this element has a mens rea dimension/component—the intent to 
commit homicide/murder and grave bodily injury. The act should be 
committed intentionally with a view to cause death or serious bodily injury. 
Purpose of the act 
Fulfilment of the above element makes a certain conduct to be a candidate to 
be treated as a terrorist act.64 The eligible conduct that fits this category 
would be a terrorist crime where the actor possesses the ‘right’ state of mind 
(intention)65 which constitutes the second element under paragraph 2(1)(b) 
of the Convention. This element relates to the purpose of doing the act. A 
base offence would be a terrorist act “when the purpose of such act … is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” The actor must have at 
least one of the three purposes while doing an act intending to cause death or 
serious bodily injury on a civilian.   
Any act that is intended to cause or has actually caused death or serious 
bodily injury not accompanied at least by one of these purposes would not 
constitute a terrorist act. Thus, the purpose for which the doer of the act 
committed it gives a terrorist nature to what is otherwise an ordinary crime.  
Cassese refers to this component as the hallmark of a terrorist act.66 
While the definition is framed in such a manner that it provides three 
alternative purposes for a terrorist to engage in a terrorist act, the primary 
goal of a terrorist act is always that of compelling a public or private 
institution to take a certain course of action. Logically, intimidating a 
population, though listed as one possible purpose of a terrorist act, can only 
be used as a means, as opposed to a purpose, for compelling a government 
or another institution to do or to refrain from doing something.  As observed 
                                           
61 Young (2006), supra note 11,  pp. 53-55 
62 Weigend (2006), supra note 47, p. 929. 
63 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 129. 
64 Weigend (2006), supra note 47, p. 929. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Cassese (2006), supra note 54, 939. 
388                            MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 8, No.2                          December 2014  
 
 
by Fletcher, imposition of fear on the population is a means to reach some 
political objective.67 In a similar fashion Cassese, referring to scaring the 
population, notes that “it is never an end in itself”.68 
Incorporating intimidating a population as one possible end of a terrorist 
act makes it easy for law enforcement agencies to get a conviction where the 
doer’s demands in connection with certain acts are unclear.69 In such cases, 
it is enough for the prosecution to show that the actor’s immediate purpose 
is to spread fear among the public. The purpose of the act being inferred 
from the ‘nature’ or ‘context’ of the act,70 as opposed to knowledge or intent 
on the part of the actor that his action will intimidate the population, gives 
credence to this interpretation. 
3.2. OAU Convention 
Article 1(3)(a) of the OAU Convention defines a terrorist act as:  
any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and 
which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause 
serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or 
causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural 
resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended 
to: 
(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, 
institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain 
from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or 
to act according to certain principles; or 
                                           
67 Fletcher (2006), supra note33, p. 902. 
68 Cassese (2006),  supra note 54, p. 939 
69 Fletcher (2006), supra note 33, p. 902. 
70 On this Weigend writes that inference from nature or context  “means that all that 
has to be proved is that the actor had mens rea with respect to the base crime 
(murder, assault or destruction of property) and that that crime was committed in 
a ‘context’ that the court deems indicative of terrorism. That is unsatisfactory 
because the largely increased penalties provided for terrorists can be justified 
only when the actor is proven to have intended or known that his acts will 
intimidate the population or interfere with important government functions. 
Moreover, since the actus reus of terrorist attacks does not differ from ‘ordinary’ 
offences, being labeled a terrorist hinges on the presence of a specific subjective 
element. Leaving determination of that defining element to inference means that 
the court can without conclusive proof put the terrorist label on one defendant 
and withhold it from another. Weigend (2006) supra note 47, p. 923 
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(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the 
public or to create a  public emergency; or 
(iii) create general insurrection in a State. 
Base Offence 
The definition captures “any act … which may endanger the life, physical 
integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death … or causes or may 
cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental 
or cultural heritage … .”  Not every act falls within the domain of the base 
offence of a terrorist act. There are specific protected interests acting against 
which would make the act potentially a terrorist act. Either the act should 
endanger or be a transgression against life, physical integrity or liberty of a 
human person or it should be a wrongdoing against public or private 
property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage.71 
The definition provision does not require that there be actual or risk of 
harm/damage or that there be actual endangering of life, physical integrity, 
or freedom. It simply requires that an act may result in any of the proscribed 
consequences. The term ‘may’ is ambiguous. It includes any probability 
(greater than zero less than 100 percent) that an act would result in the 
consequences/states of fact. There is no requirement that the actor intends to 
bring about these consequences or states of fact. Thus, in so far as other 
elements of the definition are satisfied, almost any act arguably “may” result 
in the proscribed consequences or states of fact, which deprives any value of 
incorporating this element. 
The definition speaks about the status of the base offence under the 
criminal law of a state party to the convention. By providing that terrorist act 
means “any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and 
…”, the definition provision indicates that it does not capture every 
perpetration of violence against the above mentioned protected interests. It 
requires that the act, even where it is not accompanied by the purpose 
elements of the definition of a terrorist act, be criminalized under criminal 
law of member states as non-terrorist ordinary offence. In other words, it is 
                                           
71 Even these acts would not be considered as a terrorist act if the situation in which 
the acts are committed falls under article 3 of the Convention. According to this 
provision, “the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of 
international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed 
struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign 
forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.” 
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not any act that causes death, bodily injury, damage to property and other 
consequences or states of fact that falls within the domain of acts which are 
potentially terrorist acts. An act which may cause any of the proscribed 
harms or states of fact would be eligible to the category of terrorist acts to 
the extent it is criminalized in a domestic criminal law.72 
Purpose of the Act  
The definition provides for a list of three possible purposes that the actor 
might intend his act to serve.  Each consists of a broad coverage of purposes. 
The first purpose is to “intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any 
government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to 
do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular 
standpoint, or to act according to certain principles.” This purpose has four 
component elements. First, it relates to exerting certain pressure and/to 
terrorize--intimidating, putting in fear, forcing, coercing or inducing. 
Second, this pressure is exerted on “any government, body, institution, the 
general public or any segment thereof.” Third, the actor may demand any of 
those against whom he exercises pressure. This is as opposed to the 
definition under the Suppression of Financing Convention where though the 
pressure might be directed at the public or its part and the government, it is 
only the government that the actor demands to do or not to do something.73 
Fourth, the demand might have a variety of forms. It may relate to 
demanding any of the aforementioned “to do or abstain from doing any act, 
or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to 
certain principles.” Unless the latter two are argued to be subsumed in “to 
do or to refrain from doing,” the phrase incorporated in the Suppression of 
Financing Convention, in which case the definition would be criticised for 
being redundant, the African definition is broader than the UN definition.  
The second purpose of committing any of the base offences relates to 
disrupting any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the 
public or to creating a public emergency. The third possible purpose of 
doing any of the acts to be a terrorist act is the creation of general 
                                           
72 Because national criminal laws relating to protection of life, security and freedom 
of a person and to property are not likely to be identical including this 
requirement opens a room for variety of definitions of terrorist act across the 
continent. This definition recognizes a possibility where a terrorist act for one 
state is not so for another state.   
73 Christian Walter (2003), Defining Terrorism in National and International law, 
p.13. Retrieved from:   
    <https://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliography/Biblio_Terr_Def_Walter_2003.pdf> 
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insurrection in a State. These two purposes envisioned by the definition 
provision are not included in the definition under the Suppression of 
Financing Convention. Because the three possible purposes of committing 
an act are provided alternatively, it seems that an act can be a terrorist act 
without being intended to compel government or public or part of it to do an 
act or refrain from doing an act. To that extent, the definition lacks what is 
considered as the core feature/characteristic of a terrorist act.   
4. Definition of a terrorist act under the Proclamation  
Article 3 of Proclamation No. 652/2009 titled ‘terrorist acts’74 provides: 
Whosoever or a group intending to advance a political, religious or 
ideological cause by coercing the government, intimidating the public or 
section of the public, or destabilizing or destroying the fundamental 
political, constitutional or, economic or social institutions of the country: 
1) causes a person’s death or serious bodily injury; 
2) creates serious risk to the safety or health of the public or section of 
the public; 
3) commits kidnapping or hostage taking; 
4) causes serious damage to property; 
5) causes damage to natural resource, environment, historical or 
cultural heritages; 
6) endangers, seizes or puts under control, causes serious interference 
or disruption of any public service; or 
7) threatens to commit any of the acts stipulated under sub-articles (1) 
to (6) of this Article; 
is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 15 years to life or with 
death. 
Base offence 
The definition provides for list of seven ‘base offences’ the commission of 
which would constitute a terrorist act when accompanied by subjective 
elements incorporated in the introductory part of the provision. While some 
of the base offences require that a certain result (harm) be achieved, others 
do not. For the latter, creating danger or risk of harm suffices.  
                                           
74 Though Article 3 of the Anti-terrorism proclamation is titled ‘terrorist acts’, it 
simply prescribes the punishment attached to the acts which are listed thereunder. 
However, we assume that the provision is intended to define a terrorist act as an 
act which satisfies the conditions provided thereunder.  
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To the first belong causing a person’s death or bodily injury, serious 
damage to property, damage75 to natural resources, environment, historical 
or cultural heritages, causing serious interference or disruption of any public 
services and kidnapping or taking of hostages.  Two of the offences on the 
list belong to the second category: creating serious risk to safety or health of 
the public or section of the public and endangering, seizing or putting under 
control of any public services. The seventh on the list criminalizes, as a 
terrorist act, a mere threat to commit any of the other six.  
Purpose of the act 
The purpose for which the doer did commit an act makes what is otherwise 
an ordinary crime a terrorist crime.76  As noted by Thomas Weigend, “the 
offender’s ‘specific’ intent accompanying his overt act is what sets a 
terroristic murder, bombing or assault apart from an ‘ordinary’ crime of the 
same kind.”77 
The definition requires that the base offence be committed with intent to 
serve one of the several purposes for it to be a terrorist act. Three possible 
purposes are envisaged. These are coercing government in Ethiopia (at state 
or federal level) or foreign government or international organization; 
intimidating the public or section of the public; or destabilizing or 
destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
institutions of Ethiopia. With regard to the level of pressure on the 
government, it is required that the actor intends to ‘influence’ the 
government. It is noteworthy that the Amharic version provides for 
‘coercion’ which is a higher and narrower form of pressure. A draft of the 
law, dated January 2009, used the words “coercing or intimidating” in place 
of “influence.”78 
As Human Rights Watch observes, “it is not clear if the change 
represents a government attempt to make the definition of terrorism broader 
…, or whether this is primarily a translation issue”.79 Be the reason for 
change of words as it may, for interpretation purpose the Amharic version of 
                                           
75 The Amharic version requires that the damage be serious as in the case of damage 
to property. 
76 Young argues “intimidation or coercion should be regarded as a necessary 
element of terrorism as a legal concept at international law.” Young (2006), 
supra note 11, p. 57. 
77 Weigend (2006), supra note 47, p. 923. 
78 Human Rights Watch (2009), supra note 2, p. 3.  
79 Ibid. 
The Scope and Definition of a Terrorist Act under Ethiopian Law: …                        393 
 
 
legislation prevails over the English.80 Thus, courts would apply the 
Amharic version that retains the word which was used at the draft stage of 
the legislation thereby avoiding the possible expansive consequence of the 
term introduced in the final English version of the definition provision.  
The proclamation’s definition incorporates the phrase “… coercing the 
government, intimidating the public or section of the public, or…”, and 
because of the wording of the definition, it is not clear if these are provided 
as purposes of a terrorist act. Adding to the confusion, possible motives of 
the actor (advancing a political, religious or ideological cause) are 
incorporated as elements of the definition of a terrorist act. In principle, 
motive is irrelevant in establishing criminal responsibility.81 
Owing to phrasing, the introductory part of the definition which states 
“whosoever …intending to advance a political, religious or ideological cause 
by coercing the government, intimidating the public or section of the public, 
or…” suggests that what are normally considered as purposes of a terrorist 
act are stated as means of achieving the motives. 
5. Appraisal of the definition vis-à-vis the standard 
definitions 
This Section examines the proclamation’s definition of a terrorist act in light 
of the definitions provided under the international and regional legal 
instruments. It has been argued earlier that the resolution points to a 
definition of terrorist act that states ought to follow while passing their own 
counterterrorism legislation. As noted above, by ratifying the OAU 
Convention, Ethiopia has voluntarily accepted the definition provided 
thereunder as a guiding definition.  
                                           
80 Federal Negarit Gazeta Establishment, 1995, Art. 2(4), Proc. No. 3, Neg. Gaz. 
Year 1, No.3 
81 Fletcher, G.P. (2000), Rethinking Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University 
press), p. 452; Kent Roach (2001), ‘The New Terrorism Offences and the 
Criminal Law’ in: Ronald J Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach (eds), The 
Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Antiterrorism Bill (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto) p. 156; Kent Roach (2007), ‘The Case for Defining 
Terrorism With Restraint and Without Reference to Political or Religious 
Motive’ in: Andrew Lynch et al (eds) (2007), Law and Liberty in the War on 
Terror (Federation Press, Sydney), p. 43. 
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Because the proclamation has been enacted with a view, inter alia, to 
enforce these regional and international legal instruments,82 examining the 
proclamation’s definition of a terrorist act vis-a-vis the definitions in these 
instruments would mean judging it by its own standard.  
5.1. Elements where the Proclamation’s definition reveals 
broadness 
 Base offence 
This part of the definition of a terrorist act under the Proclamation deviates 
from the international definition in two major points. First, it encompasses 
conduct not incorporated in the latter. Among the list of seven acts under 
Article 3 of the Proclamation only the first, namely, an act that “causes a 
person’s death or serious bodily injury” is captured by the meaning of a 
terrorist act under Paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Suppression of Financing 
Convention. Others are not envisaged by the definition of a terrorist act 
under the international instrument.83 UN Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights and Counterterrorism holds the view that the concept of terrorism 
                                           
82 Preamble part of the Proclamation; Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(2008/2009), supra note 9, p. 133. 
83 This assertion on the proclamation’s deviation from the definition under the 
Suppression of Financing Convention is subject to a proviso. The fact that an act 
is not covered by the general definition of a terrorist act under Article 2(1) (b) of 
the Suppression of Financing Convention does not necessarily exclude it from 
being a terrorist act under the Convention. By virtue of its Article 2(1) (a), the 
Convention treats acts proscribed by the treaties listed on its Annex as a terrorist 
act without requiring that the act relates to causing damage to one’s life or body. 
Thus, to the extent the other acts listed in the definition of the anti-terrorism 
proclamation fall within the scope of the specific anti-terrorism treaties,83 the acts 
would still be within the scope of the Convention’s definition. For example, 
under Diplomatic Agents Convention (1973) kidnapping of an internationally 
protected person, in and by itself, constitutes a terrorist act. That means, while 
incorporating kidnapping as a base offence of terrorist act under the anti-
terrorism proclamation appears to go beyond the scope of definition of a terrorist 
act under the Suppression of Financing Convention, to the extent it is applied for 
an internationally protected person (as defined in the Diplomatic Agents 
Convention) it is compatible with the Convention’s definition.  Similarly, if a 
hostage taking is accompanied by “threat to kill, to injure or to continue to detain 
another person,” it would fall under the Hostages Convention (1979) making its 
inclusion in the definition of a terrorist act under the Anti-terrorism proclamation 
harmonious with the definition under Suppression of Financing Convention.  
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should be limited to acts committed with the intention of causing death or 
serious bodily injury, Kidnapping and the taking of hostages, and not 
property crimes’84 
Commenting on this divergence of the Proclamation’s definition, 
Amnesty International indicates: 
This definition of terrorism includes acts that do not involve violence or 
injury to people, such as property crimes and disruption of public 
services. The United Nations special rapporteur on counterterrorism 
and human rights has stated that the concept of terrorism should be 
limited to acts committed with the intention of causing death or serious 
bodily injury, or the taking of hostages, and should not include property 
crimes.85 
Secondly, under the Convention’s definition an act, to be a terrorist act, must 
have been intended to cause death or bodily injury. The definition under the 
Anti-terrorism proclamation does not require that the act be intended by the 
actor to cause the harm or risk listed thereunder. Nor does the definition call 
for the harm or risk results from negligence. In so far as one’s act results in 
death, bodily injury or any of the consequences listed in the definition, 
irrespective of mens rea of the actor relating to the consequence, it will 
constitute a base offence of a terrorist act under the antiterrorism 
proclamation. It follows that if other elements of the definition are fulfilled, 
an act which causes death, bodily injury, or any other harm or danger of 
harm listed thereunder would be treated as a terrorist act even if the actor did 
not intend the act to bring about such result.  
While the proclamation’s definition and the OAU definition share most 
of the base offences86 of a terrorist act, a close look at the definitions reveals 
the following differences. Under both definitions, any act that causes death 
or bodily injury would constitute a terrorist act if accompanied by other 
elements. However, while the Ethiopian definition requires actual death or 
bodily injury, the OAU definition makes an act “which may endanger” one’s 
“life, physical integrity” as well a potentially terrorist act.  Similarly unlike 
the Ethiopian definition which requires actual kidnapping or taking of 
                                           
84 Human rights Watch, Ethiopia: Amend draft law proposed counterterrorism 
legislation violates human rights. Retrieved from: 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/30/ethiopia-amend-draft-terror-law>. 
85 Human Rights Watch (2009), supra note 2. 
86 Causing serious injury or death; causing damage to property; and causing damage 
to natural resources, environmental and cultural heritages constitute base 
offences under both definitions. 
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hostages, an act that “may endanger freedom” suffices to constitute a base 
offence of a terrorist act under the OAU Convention. While both the OAU 
Convention and the anti-terrorism proclamation declare damage to property 
as one of the base offences, only the latter requires that the damage be 
‘serious’.  There are acts which are declared as potentially terrorist under the 
definition of the Proclamation but not under the OAU definition. These are 
an act that causes damage on historical heritage, and an act that “creates 
serious risk to the safety or health of the public or section of the public.”  
The failure of Article 3 of the Proclamation to require criminal fault 
relating to the act that causes any of the harms or risks listed thereunder is a 
major gap making it broader than Article 1(3) of the OAU convention in 
relation to the base offences that the two definitions share. The latter, inter 
alia, requires that the act be criminalized under criminal law of state parties, 
which ensures the fulfilment of the mens rea element. The definition under 
Article 3 of the Proclamation does not require that the conduct be 
independently criminalized under the Criminal Code or in any other criminal 
law of Ethiopia. Nor does it require that there be criminal fault in causing 
the harm or risk of harm.  
Thus, if the other elements of a terrorist act provided in the introductory 
part87 of Article 3 are fulfilled, the person who ‘causes’ any of the listed 
harms thereunder, be it accidentally or negligently, will be treated as a 
terrorist person. That is, in so far as one’s intention “to advance a political, 
religious or ideological cause” through “coercing the government, 
intimidating the public or section of the public, or destabilizing or destroying 
the fundamental political, constitutional or, economic or social institutions 
of the country” is known and can be proved,  then he will automatically be 
considered as a terrorist person if his act causes any of the harms or risks of 
harm listed thereunder, with no need to prove that the act was intended or 
committed negligently.  The OAU Convention does not allow that. 
Purpose of the Act  
For a certain act to be a terrorist act under the Suppression of Financing 
Convention, its purpose should be “to intimidate a population, or to compel 
a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing 
any act.” Range of purposes of committing the base offence of a terrorist act 
is provided in the Proclamation’s definition. These are “coercing the 
government, intimidating the public or section of the public, or destabilizing 
                                           
87 As discussed below the intention requirement provided in the introductory 
statement applies to other elements of the definition. 
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or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional or, economic or social 
institutions of the country.”  While broadly speaking the two definitions 
refer to similar purposes, there are important differences.  Coercing an 
international organization to do or to refrain from doing a certain act, one of 
the purposes under the Convention’s definition, is not included among the 
purposes under the Proclamation’s definition. On the other hand 
“destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional or, 
economic or social institutions of the country,” which constitutes one 
possible purpose for a terrorist act under the proclamation, is not covered by 
the Convention’s definition.  
Under the Convention’s definition, the coercion against the government 
is to force it to take some steps—to do or to refrain from doing a certain 
act(s). Apart from requiring that there be coercion, the anti-terrorism 
proclamation does not explicitly indicate that the actor demands the 
government to do or to refrain from doing something. Any sort of coercion 
(with no need to show that the coercer demands the government to do or to 
refrain from doing a specified act) suffices to satisfy this element of the 
definition. On the other hand, while the requirement that the actor be 
motivated by religious, political or ideological causes is incorporated under 
the Ethiopian definition, it is not relevant under the international definition. 
The specific treaties listed in the Annex to the Suppression of Financing 
Convention do not require that an act they respectively proscribe be intended 
to influence the government or intimidate the public for it to be considered 
as a terrorist act. Because the purpose element of the definition under Article 
3 of the anti-terrorism proclamation is applicable to all eligible base offences 
(including those covered by specific treaties), the Proclamation provides for 
a narrower instance where these acts would be treated as terrorist acts. Thus, 
an act which may not be treated as a terrorist act under the proclamation 
because it is not accompanied by the purpose element of the definition might 
be a terrorist act under the Suppression of Financing Convention upon 
satisfying any one of the treaties listed in the Annex to the Convention. 
While the definition under the Proclamation does not provide what is 
being demanded and from whom, the purpose of committing a terrorist act 
under the OAU Convention is to “intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or 
induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment 
thereof.” And the demand is to be made against any of them “to do or 
abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or 
to act according to certain principles.” 
Disrupting public service, the delivery of any essential service to the 
public, which is treated as a base offence under the proclamation, is treated 
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as one possible purpose of committing the base offence under the OAU 
convention definition. As a consequence, under the OAU Convention but 
not under the Proclamation, causing property damage or any of the base 
offences provided thereunder with a view to “disrupt any public service or 
the delivery of any essential service to the public” would constitute a 
terrorist act with no need to establish intimidation, putting in fear, forcing, 
coercing or inducing any government, body, institution, the general public or 
any segment thereof. 
While the definition under the OAU Convention envisions different level 
of pressure (forcing, coercion or inducement) as constituting the purpose of 
committing the base offence, the Proclamation’s definition captures only the 
extreme influence (coercion) on the government. 
  5.2. Elements where the Proclamation’s definition reveals 
narrowness 
Requirement of actor’s motive88 
The proclamation’s definition, unlike the regional and international 
definitions, requires that the base offence and purpose of the act be 
accompanied by specific motive. It is where “whosoever or a group 
intending to advance a political, religious or ideological cause …” commits 
the proscribed act with the proscribed purpose that a terrorist act is said to be 
committed under the Proclamation’s definition.  A document that provides a 
brief explanation about the draft anti-terrorism proclamation makes 
reference to the motive of the doer of a terrorist act as one of the factors that 
makes a terrorist act different from other ordinary crimes.89  However, under 
international law, what makes one a terrorist is not the motive for doing the 
                                           
88 For a discussion on the background of how the requirement of motive was made 
element of definitions in some jurisdictions see: Douglas (2010), supra note 14, 
Must terrorists act for a cause? The motivational requirement in definitions of 
terrorism in the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 36:2, 295-312, DOI: 10.1080/03050718.2010.481400  
89 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2008/2009), supranote9, p.71. For 
more arguments in support of the motive requirement see: Douglas (2010), supra 
note 14,  p. 307- 311; Ben Saul (2007), ‘The Curious Element of Motive in 
Definitions of Terrorism: Essential Ingredient or Criminalising Thought’ in: 
Andrew Lynch et al (eds) (2007) , Law and Liberty in the War on Terror 
(Federation Press, Sydney ), 29–30; Saul (2006), supra note 30,  pp. 38–41 
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act but the purpose of doing the act.90 John Dugard went as far as arguing 
that “an ideal definition of terrorism “should expressly state that motive is 
irrelevant in determining whether an act of terrorism has been 
committed”.91 As argued by some, the inclusion of this element would 
unduly narrow the definition and cause unnecessary hurdle for the 
prosecution to get terrorists convicted.92 
Objecting incorporation of this requirement under Australian law “the 
Commonwealth DPP and the Attorney General’s Department argued before 
the Security Legislation Review Committee that it was ‘not in the public 
interest for a person to avoid criminal liability by showing that his or her 
acts were motivated by something other than politics, religion or 
ideology”.93 
Failure to protect the public in a foreign country  
Another area where the definition has a narrow scope of application relates 
to the public that it protects. There is state obligation under international law 
to cooperate with other governments in counterterrorism.  This suggests that 
a terrorist act, no matter where it is committed or/and against whom it is 
committed, should be proscribed by every state. However, the definition 
provision of the anti-terrorism proclamation restricts scope of application of 
the law to the protection of the Ethiopian public. Because the term 
‘government’ is defined as “the federal or a state government or a 
government body or a foreign government or an international organization”, 
it is not confined to protect the state and federal governments of Ethiopia.  
                                           
90 Cassese, supra note 54, pp. 940ff. Duchemann attributes the absence of the 
motive element in international conventions to the need to reach consensus on the 
definitions. Adam Duchemann, Defining Terrorism in International Law so as to 
Foster the Protection of Human Rights,  retrieved from: 
<https://www.academia.edu/2912017/Defining_Terrorism_in_International_Law
_so_as_to_Foster_the_Protection_of_Human_Rights>. 
91 John Dugard (1974), “International Terrorism: Problems of Definition”, RIIA, 
Vol. 50, no 1, p. 80. 
92 Commonwealth Secretariat, Draft Model Legislation on Measures to Combat 
terrorism 42 (2002); Cassese, supra note 54, p. 941. For more on criticism of the 
motive requirement see: Douglas (2010), Supra note 14, 301-307. DOI: 
10.1080/03050718.2010.481400 
93 Nicola McGarity (2010), “Testing” our counterterrorism laws: the prosecution of 
individuals for terrorism offences in Australia 34 Crim LJ , 92-127, p.114, note 
182. 
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The definition captures an act committed to coerce foreign governments. 
However, it does not capture acts intended to intimidate a public or part of a 
public of another state94 and acts intended to destabilize or destroy the 
fundamental political, constitutional or economic or social institutions of 
foreign country as terrorist. While the definitions under the Suppression of 
Financing Convention and the OAU Convention capture intimidation or 
putting in fear of any state’s population or a part thereof, the Proclamation’s 
definition applies only to Ethiopian population or a segment thereof.  This 
approach would have an unacceptable consequence. For example, 
committing an act resulting in any of the harms or risks listed under the 
definition would not make one a terrorist if s/he intends to intimidate the 
public in a foreign country contrary to the international and regional 
definitions.  
6. What do the discrepancies mean for the validity of the 
definition under the Proclamation? 
We note, in the previous section, that the definition of a terrorist act under 
the proclamation deviates from the regional and international definitions. 
While relating to some aspects the definition in the proclamation is wider in 
scope, on other aspects it is narrower. This section deals with the effect of 
these discrepancies on the validity of the proclamation’s definition, which 
turns on what the resolution and the OAU Convention require of states in 
relation to criminalization of a terrorist act.  
To this end, we need to examine whether the instruments instruct states to 
criminalize certain conduct, without meanwhile requiring them not to 
criminalize other conduct, as a terrorist act, or whether they require states to 
criminalize certain conduct, but not others, as a terrorist act. In the former 
scenario, the states would comply with the instruments by criminalizing 
every conduct that falls within the respective meaning of a terrorist act in the 
two instruments. States are free to adopt a definition that captures conduct 
beyond what the instruments treated as a terrorist act. It follows that a 
domestic definition would be in conflict with international or regional 
definition only where the domestic definition fails to capture, but not where 
it goes beyond, a conduct criminalized by the latter.  
                                           
94 Unlike Article 2(1) (b) of the Suppression of Financing Convention which is 
phrased as “---is to intimidate a population” Article 3 of the proclamation is 
formulated as “---intimidating the general public or section of the public …” 
which refers only to the Ethiopian public or section of the Ethiopian public. 
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If, on the other hand, the instruments require states to criminalize as 
terrorist act only a conduct that their respective definition captures (no less 
no more), states will be obliged to confine their definition of a terrorist act to 
the definitions in the regional and international instruments. Under this 
interpretation, for a state to comply with the instruments, its definition of a 
terrorist act should match that provided under the respective definitions of 
the two instruments.95 It follows that state definition would contravene with 
the respective definitions of the two instruments not only where it fails to 
include, but also where it goes beyond, a conduct that the latter captures.  
Scholars who criticise the Security Council for not including a definition 
of a terrorist act under its resolution 137396 would support the second 
interpretation. They are of the view that had there been a definition under 
resolution no 1373, states would have been required to adopt that definition. 
They attribute the proliferation of divergent definitions of a terrorist act 
across the globe to the Security Council’s alleged failure to attribute 
meaning to a terrorist act in its resolution 137397 and blame98 the Council for 
this. Amnesty International shares this view.99 
There is reaction of scholars to what is deemed as a definition of a 
terrorist act under Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) as being a late 
response100 to rectify the failure of resolution 1373 to define a terrorist act.  
According to these scholars, the delay has resulted in broad and divergent 
domestic definitions. The criticism is that the definition came after many of 
the states had already adopted their own definition of a terrorist act since 
2001, following the instruction under resolution 1373. This criticism is 
based on the premise that had that definition been incorporated in resolution 
1373, it would have been a mandatory definition to be adopted by states 
                                           
95 Because the definitions provided under the OAU Convention and the Suppression 
of Financing Convention are different in scope this interpretation would make it 
practically impossible for a state party to the OAU convention to adopt a 
definition of a terrorist act that would satisfy both definitions.  
96 Roach (2008), supra note 27; Saul (2005), supra note 26. 
97 Roach (2008), supra note 27, pp.  97, 98; Beth Elise Whitaker (2007), ‘Exporting 
the Patriot Act? Democracy and the ‘war on terror’ in the Third world’ 28 (5) 
Third World Quarterly, Vol 28, No. 5, p. 1017. 
98 Roach (2008), supra note 27,  pp. 98-99 
99 Noting that ‘‘the terms ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorist acts’ in resolution 1373 are open 
to widely differing interpretations,’’ Amnesty International expresses its fear that 
this may facilitate rights violations. Amnesty International (2011), Statement on 
the Implementation of SC Res 1373, 1 October 2001. 
100 Saul (2005), supra note 26, p.165; Roach (2008), supra note 27, p. 99.    
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thereby preventing the diversified and broad definitions of a terrorist act in 
domestic legislation.  
On the other hand, Reuen Young supports the first view. For Young, 
while it is crucial for states to harmonize domestic anti-terrorism laws with 
international law, the latter is “only one of the relevant considerations taken 
into account in the anti-terrorism law-making process.” In view of the 
international nature of counterterrorism it is logical that states draw on 
“international law’s jurisprudence concerning the definition of terrorism,” 
and states, according to Young, are “entitled to proscribe conduct beyond 
that which they are required to proscribe pursuant to international 
obligations”.101 In the following paragraph which summarizes the gist of his 
argument, Young indicates the right of the states to define a terrorist act as 
something that is derived from their sovereignty.102 
The international definition should be regarded as a minimum; states’ 
definitions should be assessed against this standard. States are entitled to 
proscribe further conduct … . To think otherwise would wrongly 
construe international law, rather than the state, as the source of 
sovereignty. 
A close reading of relevant provisions of the resolution and the OAU 
Convention confirms Young’s view. The instruments simply instruct states 
to criminalize terrorist act and other related conduct and punish those who 
are involved in such conduct. According to Paragraph 2(b) of the resolution, 
“states shall take necessary steps to prevent the commission of a terrorist 
act” of which one is criminalization and prosecution. This duty is explicitly 
stated under Paragraph 2(c) of the resolution which requires states to “ensure 
that, … terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic 
laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of 
such terrorist acts.” In connection with prosecution, the same paragraph 
instructs states to “ensure that any person who participates in the financing, 
planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting 
terrorist acts is brought to justice.” Similarly, Article 2(a) of the OAU 
Convention provides for obligation of state parties to “… establish criminal 
offences for terrorist acts as defined in this Convention and make such acts 
punishable by appropriate penalties that take into account the grave nature of 
such offences.” 
                                           
101Young (2006), supra note 11, pp. 99-100. 
102 Ibid, p. 100.  
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Owing to the transnational nature of terrorism, both the OAU Convention 
and the resolution, in their preambular103 and operative paragraphs,104 make 
reference to cooperation among states in countering terrorism.  Even though 
these paragraphs suggest that states ought to adopt a definition that would 
make cooperation possible,105 it does not necessarily mean that states need to 
define a terrorist act in exactly the same way as provided in the definitions 
of the regional and international instruments. It is only to the extent that a 
state anti-terror law relates to terrorist act that falls within the definitions of 
the regional and international instruments that another state is called upon to 
cooperate for the enforcement of the law.   
The provisions relating to cooperation should not be construed as calling 
for one state to cooperate with another in the enforcement of the latter’s anti-
terrorism law in its full extent. Because provisions relating to cooperation in 
counterterrorism are applicable in relation to terrorist acts as understood in 
the respective definitions of the two instruments, defining a terrorist act in 
such a manner that it encompasses a conduct that the respective definitions 
                                           
103  The seventh and eighth paragraphs of the resolution respectively states: 
“Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist 
acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of 
the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism,” and 
“Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by 
taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories 
through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of 
terrorism.” 
The sixth paragraph of the OAU Convention  provides: 
desirous of strengthening cooperation among Member States in order to 
forestall and combat terrorism 
104 Paragraph 2(f) of the resolution requires that states “[a]fford one another the 
greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or 
criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, 
including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the 
proceedings”; Paragraph 3 (a-e) of the resolution call for states to engage in 
different joint activities with a view to fight terrorism. Article 5 of the OAU 
Convention provides for range of areas where state parties need to cooperate in 
countering terrorism. 
105 Paragraphs relating to cooperation among states in counterterrorism would be 
effectively implemented if states define a terrorist act consistently. Thus, state 
compliance with the definition provided under the respective definitions of the 
OAU Convention and the resolution would facilitate consistency among 
domestic definitions which in turn facilitates the cooperation in countering 
terrorism. 
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of the two instruments captures plus some other conduct would not have 
impact on the enforcement of these provisions. These provisions simply 
reinforce the argument that state definitions should be broad enough to 
encompass every act that falls within the scope of the definitions of the 
OAU convention and the resolution. Thus, the provisions, the enforcement 
of which envisages communality among domestic definitions of a terrorist 
act, should not lead one to the conclusion that states are not allowed to 
define a terrorist act differently from the definitions under the regional and 
international instruments. 
Both the regional and international legal instruments require states to 
criminalize certain conduct as terrorist act with no explicit or tacit 
prohibition of states from adopting broader definition of a terrorist act. Thus, 
state definition’s being broader than the regional or international definition 
does not make it incompatible with the latter. The definition of a terrorist act 
under the Anti-terrorism proclamation, by incorporating acts which are not 
within the scope of the base offence of the international and regional 
meaning of a terrorist act, is broader than the latter. But that does not make it 
in contravention of these instruments. However, a definition that is broad so 
as to embrace conduct other than that envisioned under the Suppression of 
Financing Convention and the OAU Convention may have a negative 
consequence on human rights.106 
A state definition will be incompatible with the international and regional 
definition to the extent it fails to capture a conduct which falls within the 
scope of the international and regional definitions respectively. The 
definition of a terrorist act under the proclamation, by requiring motive as an 
additional element and by excluding a crime committed against a public in a 
foreign state, makes it narrower than the meaning attributed to a terrorist act 
under resolution 1373 and the OAU convention. 
Conclusion  
While there has been live controversy surrounding the scope of definition of 
a terrorist act under the Ethiopian anti-terrorism law, both sides of the debate 
do not seem to ground their arguments on relevant standard.  One cannot 
claim that the definition of a terrorist act under the Anti-terrorism 
                                           
106 Laetitia Bader, Human Rights Watch’s researcher on Ethiopia, criticises the 
definition as being broad so as to include peaceful protests and lawful speech. 
IRIN (2012), Briefing: Ethiopia's ONLF rebellion. Retrieved from: 
      <http://www.irinnews.org/report/96658/briefing-ethiopia-s-onlf-rebellion>. 
The Scope and Definition of a Terrorist Act under Ethiopian Law: …                        405 
 
 
Proclamation is wide or narrow without a standard. This article proposes the 
definitions provided under the OAU Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which has been endorsed by the 
Security Council resolution 1373, to be the appropriate standards in light of 
which the scope of the Proclamation’s definition has to be evaluated.  
Examination of the Proclamation’s definition in light of these standard 
definitions reveals that while in respect to some elements the definition in 
the proclamation is broader, in others it is narrower.  
Although broadness does not, per se, make the definition in the 
proclamation incompatible with the standard definitions, it might ultimately 
render the definition to be constitutionally, and from human rights 
perspective, suspicious. Because the regional and international instruments 
instruct states to criminalize conduct that falls within the scope of their 
respective definitions, narrowness of the Proclamation’s definition, on the 
other hand, makes the definition incompatible with the international and 
regional definitions. Its strict application would mean non-prosecution or, in 
the event of prosecution, acquittal of persons who would be treated as 
terrorist under regional and international law. The definition, by leaving 
some terrorist acts unaddressed, makes Ethiopia fail to discharge its 
counterterrorism responsibility. Moreover, this defeats one of the 
proclamation’s declared purpose, i.e., enforcement of the regional and 
international counterterrorism instruments.                                                    ■   
                                                                   
 
 
